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In October 2009, the then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
telephoned the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to 
request that a boat carrying 255 Sri Lankan Tamils, heading for Australia’s 
Christmas Island, be intercepted and escorted to the port of Merak on 
the north-western tip of Java. The Indonesians obliged, but a six-month 
long stand-off ensued when the asylum seekers refused to disembark 
at Merak until they had been assured passage to Australia. At a refu-
gee support rally in the city of Melbourne on 1 May 2010, Aboriginal 
Australian activists responded to the stand-off by producing Original 
Nation Passports for the Merak asylum seekers. This was a defiant rejoin-
der to the Australian government’s decision a fortnight prior to freeze all 
Afghan and Sri Lankan refugee claims until further notice. Aboriginal 
activist Robbie Thorpe, flanked by other activists publicly signing stacks 
of passports outside the neo-classical facade of Melbourne’s Trades Hall, 
announced: ‘we want to make it clear that the Aboriginal people, the 
true sovereigns of this land, are offering them a passport to enter into 
our territorial waters, and our land’, adding, ‘we’re the colonised refu-
gees’ (Juice Media 2010). A few months earlier, in June 2009, the New 
Zealand Police had charged Maori activist Gerrard Otimi with deception 
causing loss and giving immigration advice without a licence after he sold 
visas to around 100 Pacific Island (mainly Samoan) immigrants desper-
ate to remain in Aotearoa–New Zealand after the expiry of their work 
visas. Otimi charged NZ$500 per visa, which consisted of a certificate 
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and passport sticker stating that the holder was a ‘whangaied’ (adopted) 
member of Otimi’s hapu (a sub-tribal grouping) and had permission to 
remain.
Aboriginal and Maori jurisdictions over and responsibilities toward 
newcomers are negotiated under the spotlight of mainstream cul-
tural and political life as well as in fringe activism. In February 2008, 
an Aboriginal right to welcome was recognized at the opening of the 
Australian parliament, when Prime Minister Rudd delivered a speech 
acknowledging ‘traditional’ owners of the land after being presented with 
a message stick during a ‘Welcome to Country’ ceremony performed by 
Aboriginal people.1 Similar rituals and statements of acknowledgement 
of Aboriginal custodians are relatively common at events and gather-
ings in Australia, but they had never been part of the opening of federal 
parliament until 2008. In Aotearoa–New Zealand, a powhiri — a wel-
come ceremony involving a warrior challenge, songs, dance, the laying 
of a peace offering, and a hongi (pressing of noses and exchange of ha, 
or life breath) — is customarily performed for manuhiri (guests). On the 
occasion that manuhiri are international dignitaries the powhiri becomes 
a high profile, mediatized event — a signifier of Aotearoa–New Zealand’s 
unique cultural ‘heritage’. Since the 1980s, powhiri has been part of the 
opening protocols of parliament in the officially bicultural (Maori and 
Pakeha),2 bilingual (Maori and English) nation. What seems to have 
emerged in both national contexts is a performative, civic acknowledge-
ment of indigenous sovereign territoriality that inheres in the right to 
welcome, or presumably reject, the newcomer.
Considered side-by-side, indigenous activism via the production of 
passports or visas (a reterritorialization of valorised documents of state 
power) and indigenous welcome protocols and ceremonies (which pub-
licly enact the idea of an unextinguished indigenous territorial author-
ity) suggest something of the schizoid cultural conditions under which 
Aboriginal and Maori status claims exist in Australia and Aotearoa–New 
Zealand today. The juxtaposition draws attention, ultimately, to con-
tested ontologies of sovereignty. In Aotearoa–New Zealand, the Treaty 
of Waitangi (1840) between several Maori tribes and the British Crown, 
1 The following morning, as the first item of Parliamentary business, Rudd 
delivered a landmark formal apology to the Aboriginal Stolen Generations.
2 A ‘Pakeha’ is a New Zealander of European ethnic origins, although the term 
is occasionally used to refer to any non-Maori person.
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while beset by historical violations and ongoing dispute over key terms 
relating to the relinquishment of Maori sovereignty,3 represents at least a 
structural basis upon which Maori self-determination or self-governance 
may be negotiated. In Australia, where British sovereignty was founded 
in the absence of any such treaty, the symbolism of the ‘Welcome to 
Country’ does not cohere with recognizable historical or political reality. 
This underpinned a recent flurry of debate in Australia over the welcome 
ritual and acknowledgement of traditional owners, prompted by the con-
servative opposition leader Tony Abbott’s suggestion in March 2010 that 
both are often ‘out-of-place tokenism’ (quoted in Maiden 2010: 1). The 
main fault-line of the debate traced the role of symbolic thought and 
action in organizing human affairs generally, and specifically, the issue of 
whether Australians should be explicitly reminded of the unceded, unre-
solved sovereignty of Aboriginal people — in other words, of unfinished 
business.
In this chapter, I aim to examine what happens when we take indige-
nous rights and responsibilities regarding newcomers/strangers as an ana-
lytical framework, or point of departure, for understanding transnational 
positionalities (asylum seekers, refugees and visa overstayers) and local 
positionalities (Aboriginal Australians and Maori), and indeed, for per-
ceiving the synthesis of the two. I trace recent contexts of engagement, 
including protest, activism, social contact, and performance between 
Aboriginal Australians and Maori, and asylum seekers, refugees and 
overstayers. These represent certain contingent spaces for belonging 
(and less frequently, non-belonging) for people who are barred from both 
political and imagined national community. They also offer a picture of 
indigeneity as a complex and ambivalent identification, explicating some 
of the conflicted allegiances aroused by the citizen–non-citizen dichot-
omy, while foregrounding indigenous authority and knowledge as lived 
practice, and perhaps, alternative sovereignty.
The term ‘alternative sovereignty’ is a hazy one, affixing to juridico-
political, philosophical and affective meanings that can be contiguous 
or at odds; to be sure, the term runs into difficulty in its implication of 
3 The key dispute surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) relates to the 
words used to represent the concept of sovereignty. The Treaty guarantees that 
Maori tribes retain tino rangatiratanga, which translates to ‘self-determination’, or 
arguably, ‘sovereignty’. The Maori version of the Treaty states that kawanatanga, 
or governorship, is to be ceded to the British Crown, while in the English version, 
the term ‘sovereignty’ is used. For in-depth analysis, see Orange (1987).
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a paradoxical condition, that is, two absolute authorities co-existing in 
one political community. With reference to Australia, Aileen Moreton- 
Robinson argues that an understanding of indigenous rights (central 
among which is recognition of prior possession or sovereignty) must take 
into account the ways in which its inverse, ‘White possession’, func-
tions as a ‘regime of truth’ (2006: 389); she makes the point, via Michel 
Foucault, that ‘rights should not be understood as the establishment of 
legitimacy but rather the method by which subjugation is carried out’ 
(ibid.: 390). One way of understanding these methods is to look at the 
ways in which indigenous peoples influence, or do not influence, national 
juridico-political mechanisms. For the present purposes, this requires 
that geo-culturally specific attention be paid to what indigenous rights 
and practices might look like.
Whatever form of Aboriginal sovereignty Welcome to Country rituals 
and activist statements signify or articulate, its structural difference from 
executive, legislative and judicial powers — what Moreton-Robinson 
terms ‘patriarchal white sovereignty’ (Moreton-Robinson 2007: 87) — 
is vast in a nation that has only in the most recent election seen the 
first Aboriginal person elected to the Federal House of Representatives. 
Aboriginal political participation at the state and federal level is low. 
Moreton-Robinson pinpoints the ambivalence of ceremonial recognition 
in Australia, arguing that it is ‘simultaneously a reminder and a denial 
of the existence of Indigenous sovereignty. The reminder is evidenced 
by the presence of Indigenous bodies, but its denial is contained in the 
words “traditional lands”, which transports ownership back into the past 
not the continuing present’ (ibid.: 98). The gap between material sover-
eignty and what might be called affective sovereignty is conspicuous.
In Aotearoa–New Zealand, Maori political representation in the 
national parliament has been ensured since 1867 via the Maori elec-
torates (originally numbering four, and currently seven) that exist in 
addition to the general electorates. Maori voters may choose to register 
for either the general electoral roll or the Maori roll. Maori politicians 
have been a significant force in national politics since the 1980s and the 
Maori Party, founded in 2004, has a specific platform for Maori concerns 
and issues. One of the key areas of Maori juridico-political influence is 
in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi. In addition to continued posses-
sion of lands and waters, the preservation of Maori language and other 
taonga (treasures) is guaranteed in the Treaty (or in modern practice, 
in accordance with ‘Treaty principles’), and since the 1980s action in 
these areas has been relatively robust: the Kohanga Reo (Maori language 
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immersion) pre-school programme has flourished (despite changes in 
the regulatory environment in the 1990s) and Maori radio and televi-
sion stations are commercially viable. This is not to say that indigenous 
sovereignty has greater materiality in Aotearoa–New Zealand than in 
Australia: the power that articulates to sovereignty — in particular, for 
the current purposes, territorial authority over who may enter and live in 
the country — remains centralized, and centrally Pakeha.
Aboriginal Australians, Asylum Seekers  
and Refugees4
Asylum seekers who attempt to reach Australia by unauthorized means 
(especially those arriving by boat) have been the subject of extraordinarily 
high profile, controversial debates for more or less the last decade. Since 
the passing of the Migration Amendment Act, 1992, most unauthorised 
asylum seekers have been placed in immigration detention centres in 
remote mainland or offshore island locations until their refugee claim is 
processed. Particularly from 2001, when security discourse centred on 
the threat of militant Islam was intensified in Australia as in other liberal 
democracies worldwide, asylum seekers have represented a battleground 
for major party politicians who lay claim to resolute toughness on border 
protection, on stopping boat people and the smugglers who transport 
them. The national policy on asylum seekers has proven both conten-
tious and protean, readily conscripted into discourses of national iden-
tity, belonging and morality across the political and ideological spectrum. 
I will concentrate for the next few paragraphs on a particular dimension 
of this contention, one that articulates to indigenous Australian con-
cerns and activist struggles.
The tiny Aboriginal township of Ampilatwatja, 320 kilometres north-
east of Alice Springs in Australia’s Northern Territory, is one of the ‘pre-
scribed’ townships that were acquired by the federal government in 2007 
for a five-year lease under the terms of the Northern Territory National 
Emergency Response. This controversial ‘intervention’ was implemented 
via a ‘special measures’ exemption from the Racial Discrimination Act, 
1975 to address child sexual abuse and neglect in Aboriginal communi-
ties. In August 2009, a group from Ampilatwatja, who had walked off 
4 Parts of this discussion of Aboriginal Australian responses to asylum are 
developed from Cox (2011).
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their dilapidated town in protest the month before, took advantage of 
a visit to Australia by James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indig-
enous Peoples, to lodge a formal request that they be classified as refu-
gees. Spokesperson Richard Downs’s letter reads: ‘The current status of 
Aboriginal people is that we are refugees in a Country we have called 
our own since time immemorial’ and requests that the United Nations 
‘[e]nsure that the Australian government is aware of, and fulfils, its obli-
gations under the International Refugee Convention, the UN Charter 
for Human Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
and other international human rights covenants’ (Downs 2009).
While the Ampilatwatja people’s invocation of the international 
discourse of asylum is intended to situate their own position — and 
dispossession — the reactions of a number of other Aboriginal activ-
ists, elders and scholars to asylum seekers and refugees constitute quite 
a cohesive statement of responsibility for and hospitality toward the 
dispossessed other. But like the Ampilatwatja action, these responses 
also seem to be propelled by an expressed understanding of experiences 
of displacement and oppression, and in this capacity they strategically 
underscore a politicized Aboriginal identity, even as they communicate a 
humanitarian concern for the non-citizen stranger.
The Aboriginal Tent Embassy has been at the forefront of this (indeed, 
it endorsed the Original Nation passports cited at the beginning of this 
chapter). The Tent Embassy has stood on the lawn of Old Parliament 
House in Australia’s capital city, Canberra, intermittently since 1972 
and continuously since 1992. It is an enduring nexus of activist strug-
gles, especially regarding indigenous sovereignty and land rights. At a 
community event in 2000 to welcome refugees who had been resettled in 
Canberra, embassy activist Robert Craigie drew a connection between 
them and Aboriginal people, who, he asserted, had become refugees 
within their own country (Griffiths 2000). Sam Watson, Queensland 
activist and founding member of the Tent Embassy in 1972, has been 
a vocal advocate for asylum seekers and refugees for several years. In 
2001, when Australia was redefining the limits of its sovereign power and 
redrawing its maritime borders in the wake of the infamous MV Tampa 
crisis,5 Watson made a statement of mutually-constitutive solidarity: 
5 This incident involved the rescue at sea of more than 400 mainly Afghan 
asylum seekers by a Norwegian freighter ship, the MV Tampa, and the Australian 
government’s refusal to allow the ship to enter Australian territorial waters. This 
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‘The government is scapegoating refugees in the same way as they scape-
goat indigenous people’ (quoted in Mason 2001). In 2002, when mass 
hunger strikes and self-harm at the remote Woomera detention centre 
were making headlines, activist Pat Eatock extended an offer of asylum 
to detainees on behalf of the Tent Embassy. In doing so, she harnessed 
the prominence of the detainees’ plight (the Tent Embassy’s offer was 
reported in the national and international news media), denouncing 
‘callous and inhumane’ (quoted in Barkham 2002: 18) treatment at the 
same time as she explicated the claim to indigenous sovereignty that is 
at the forefront of the Embassy’s activism. The following year, a repre-
sentative from the Tent Embassy joined elders from the Bungala (Port 
Augusta), Kokatha (northern South Australia) and Adnyamathanya 
(Flinders Ranges) nations at a large rally at the (now closed) Baxter 
detention centre, near Port Augusta (Murphy 2003).
More recently, in November 2009, Watson, Eatock and Natasha 
Moore released a statement on behalf of the Socialist Alliance Indig-
enous Rights collective, asserting: ‘While Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
increasingly resembles previous Coalition PM John Howard — the arro-
gantly inflexible and hard-line political “leader” who could never admit 
to an error of judgment or say sorry — he forgets that 98 [per cent] of 
Australians are “boat people”, the descendants of boat people or, more 
recently, “plane people”’ (quoted in Green Left Weekly 2009). South 
Australian Aboriginal activists Noeleen Ryan-Lester and Linda Dare 
have articulated the same line of connection at rallies and in media inter-
views. Dare asserts: ‘Everyone in Parliament [has] got to realise that we 
are the first people of this country . . . what right have they got to lock up 
other people? They got off a bloody boat, or their ancestors did’ (quoted 
in Socialist Alternative 2005). These statements draw a line of continuity 
between successive histories of exclusion and what William E. Connolly 
terms a ‘politics of forgetting’ (1995: 138).
Another key touchstone for Aboriginal supporters of asylum seekers 
is a concept of moral duty. Gungalidda (Gulf of Carpentaria) elder and 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy member Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma (writing 
on behalf of Gungalidda elders) articulates a duty of responsibility under-
stood in terms of spiritual and ecological knowledges: ‘Before Europeans 
came here, (illegally), in the Aboriginal world, we were all different, 
prompted Australia’s territorial excision legislation, and its offshore detention 
and processing of asylum seekers has been extensively discussed in journalistic 
and scholarly forums.
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speaking different languages, but we all had the same kinship system for 
all human beings . . . everyone is part of us and we should care about 
them. We can’t separate ourselves from other human beings — it’s a 
duty’ (2002). Attempting to respond to state power on its terms and 
with reference to paradigms that exceed it, Nulyarimma negotiates an 
indistinct terrain between the rationalist epistemologies of legality and 
illegality that frame the government treatment of, and discourse on, 
asylum seekers and Aboriginal knowledge systems that fundamentally 
eschew these. And undoubtedly, discourses of morality and immorality 
are a central problem in this negotiation. Even as Nulyarimma summons 
morality, she enters once more into the epistemological bind she seeks 
to challenge (ibid.). Discourse on asylum in Australia and abroad has, in 
recent years, insistently pitted the illegality of the undocumented person 
against moral ideas: domestic security and the integrity of borders. Scholar 
Tony Birch also articulates a moral view of duty to the stranger, assert-
ing that Aboriginal people ‘must . . . assert more moral authority and 
ownership of this country. Our legitimacy does not lie within the legal 
system and is not dependent on state recognition . . . we need to claim 
and legitimate our authority by speaking out for, and protecting the rights 
of others, who live in, or visit our country’ (2000: 5). This comment high-
lights the close (perhaps constitutive) relationship between morality and 
authority, and seeks a radical reorientation of the relation; Birch writes 
in part as a call to activism to Aboriginal people ‘to speak, to write, to 
march, to protest, to be angry and put that anger into expression and 
action’ (ibid.: 7).
It should be said that responses to asylum seekers and refugees by 
Aboriginal commentators are not all supportive. Indigenous family and 
health policy worker Marion Hansen has identified asylum seekers as 
competing marginalized figures that detract from social, political and 
economic focus on Aborigines. At a National Press Club of Australia 
seminar in September 2001, Hansen expressed support for government 
policies and voiced concerns that the economic cost of detaining asylum 
seekers and subsequently assisting their resettlement in Australia threat-
ens the employment prospects of Aboriginal people and comes at the 
expense of funds for Aboriginal support and benefit programmes. Hansen 
professed to speak on behalf of indigenous people around Australia 
(Wright 2001: 3). But as far as the mobilization of support is concerned, 
three key tropes seem to emerge: Aboriginal identification with people 
who are seen to be systematically oppressed by Australian powers, a duty 
of hospitality based upon essentialist Aboriginal values, and an identified 
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commensurability between the Anglo-Celtic right to belong in Australia 
and the rights of more recent arrivals. These tropes reinforce Aboriginal 
identity in terms of oppression in the midst of belonging; dispossession in 
the midst of legitimacy; moral duty in the midst of lost authority.
What does it mean for Aboriginal people to articulate their support 
for asylum seekers in these ways? What is the psychological structure of 
this activist support and how does it construct or configure Aboriginal 
identities? James Goodman argues that Australia’s refugee support move-
ments are bifurcated in terms of national and global preoccupations; the 
former, he argues, ‘is broadly instrumental, geared to national policy 
change, effectively to remaking “the nation”, and reclaiming national 
pride against the shame of refugee detention’ while the latter ‘is more 
expressive, in demonstrating anger and outrage in the name of human 
empathy and dignity’ (2009: 270–71). Both, he maintains, are under-
pinned by deep emotional responses to the other, which provide the 
necessary impetus for cross-cultural compassion and solidarity. I would 
argue that Aboriginal activist support for asylum seekers functions in a 
way that is related to, but distinct from, these modes. Aboriginal support 
for asylum seekers tends to not attempt to reclaim national identity, to 
reassert ‘Australianness’ as a compassionate and hospitable identity; nor 
does it seek to advocate for asylum seekers on the basis of values of global 
interconnection or cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, indigenous activ-
ists identify themselves very much in localized, territorialized terms, stra-
tegically maintaining their essential difference from other Australians. 
Their outrage on behalf of asylum seekers is, I want to suggest, subtly but 
crucially different from that expressed by other activists; it is the differ-
ence between saying these are not Australian values and Australian values 
are not our values.
But if one of the consequences of emphasizing, through activism, 
an affinity with asylum and oppression is to demarcate a politicized 
Aboriginal self-identification, Aboriginal activists may risk underscoring 
the powerlessness that they seek to challenge, reinforcing the cultural 
and racial hierarchies that relegate them, along with asylum seekers, to 
a position that is starved of hope. Australian cultural scholar Ghassan 
Hage reminds us that ‘hope’ is not a soft or whimsical idea but is vital 
to social success; he observes: ‘once one has hope within one’s field of 
vision, one discovers the astounding degree to which the constellations 
of feelings, discourses and practices articulated to hope permeate social 
life’ (2003: 9). Hage argues that Australian society is organized in terms 
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of an affective economy where there is ‘deep inequality’ in the ‘distribu-
tion of hope’ (Hage 2003: 17).
I argue that it is, crucially, in clusters of interpersonal contact (which 
are often counterparts to activism) that a redistribution of hope takes 
place. Anecdotal evidence gleaned from my interviews with refugees 
points to the importance of face-to-face contact. Iranian artist and refugee 
Ardeshir Gholipour proudly describes being welcomed to Australia by 
occupants of the Canberra Aboriginal Tent Embassy; this welcome was 
deeply significant for Gholipour, whose detention for five years and 
prolonged battle to avoid deportation took a psychological toll (inter-
view with Ardeshir Gholipour, Canberra, 24 July 2008). The alternative 
authority of Aboriginal sovereignty offered similar affects of belonging in 
Australia for Iranian theatre practitioner Shahin Shafaei when, follow-
ing his release after almost two years in detention, he was, in his words, 
‘adopted’ by an indigenous community in North Queensland. Shafaei 
possesses a carved pendant given to him by this community (interview 
with Shahin Shafei, Melbourne, 19 July 2008). In these instances, an 
intimate experience of Aboriginal welcome was a crucial aspect of the 
affective work of belonging in a new country.
The importance of face-to-face welcome and support is understood by 
indigenous elder and former public administrator Lowitja O’Donoghue. 
O’Donoghue has spoken out regularly in support of asylum seekers. She 
expresses a particular sense of affinity with Afghans, citing the Afghan 
heritage of many of the indigenous people of her South Australian 
region as a result of colonial-era contact with cameleers. In recent years, 
O’Donoghue has taught English classes at her local church, and has been 
a regular presence at the so-called ‘Afghan room’ established in the home 
of her friend, broadcaster Stephen Watkins. Here, young refugees, hav-
ing spent various periods in immigration detention centres, have been 
able to cultivate a sense of belonging. One declared to a reporter who 
visited the ‘Afghan room’: ‘This is our territory’ (quoted in Jopson 2003: 
33). For O’Donoghue, the act of welcoming refugees must be performed 
in a personal as well as political capacity; in a speech she states, ‘I have 
welcomed them. They are here. They are part of us. They are grafted into 
my ancestry and my country’ (2003). The image of ‘grafting’ is a striking 
one, invoking an irreversible blood link; it performs precisely the oppo-
site function of another biological metaphor for unauthorized migration, 
that of contamination. O’Donoghue’s idea of intergenerational ‘grafting’ 
Sovereign Ontologies in Australia and Aotearoa–New Zealand  149
is intertwined with her private role as, in her words, ‘a mother figure’ 
(quoted in Jopson 2003: 33) to young individuals.
Of course, other face-to-face encounters between Aboriginal people 
and asylum seekers have manifested quite differently to this. The ambiv-
alence that can underpin territorial, embodied proximity is illustrated 
well by the indigenous Tiwi Islanders’ relationship with uninvited boat 
arrivals to their land in recent years. The Tiwi Islands are situated 80 kilo-
metres from the Northern Territory’s capital city, Darwin, and within 
the regulated zone of the Australian Defence Force Border Protection 
activities in the Arafura and Timor Seas. In November 2003, the arrival 
of a group of 14 Turkish Kurds and four Indonesian crew members at 
Melville Island led to the Australian government excising the Tiwi 
Islands from the migration zone and thus from Australian legal obliga-
tions pertaining to migration. A number of Tiwi people were reportedly 
dismayed at the government’s exertion of extraordinary powers and 
vowed not to assist Defence Force operations in future (Hodson 2003). 
But in April 2009, Tiwi Land Council executive and ranger, Andrew 
Tipungwuti, made a request to the government for greater powers to 
patrol the coastline, stating: ‘Our marine rangers don’t have adequate 
powers to help and secure these people until the right authorities arrive’ 
(quoted in Toohey 2009b: 2). Head marine ranger on the Tiwis, Jack 
Long, articulated how a fear of contagion can exist alongside a sense of 
kinship: ‘I’m Stolen Generation — my mother was full-blood and my 
father was an Afghan, so of course I’ve got some sympathy for them . . . 
The real question is about disease. We don’t know what’s coming in on 
these boats’ (quoted in Toohey 2009a). In November 2009, Tiwi Land 
Council Chairman Robert Tipungwuti made an offer to the government 
for Bathurst Island to become a site for a new immigration detention 
centre. The Tiwi community’s position at the maritime vanguard of 
unauthorized arrivals offers an alternative perspective on indigenous and 
asylum seeker engagement, reminding us that indigenous sovereignty can 
articulate as readily to defence of country as to solidarity and welcome.
Maori Activism, Pacific Island Overstayers 
and Refugees
When Gerrard Otimi’s sale of Maori visas to Pacific peoples was first 
investigated by New Zealand Police in June 2009 it generated some-
thing of a media furore. Undaunted, Otimi articulated his position to 
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the assembled journalists covering the story: ‘We give them a certificate 
to say you are now part of our tino rangitanga . . .6 They’ve been whan-
gaied into my hapu. Bye, see you later ’cause you cannot take my whanau 
[family] away’ (quoted in OneNews 2010). Perhaps not surprisingly, 
Otimi attracted a loyal following from his new hapu whangai (adopted 
members) and several hundred other Pacific Island visa overstayers who 
attended community meetings addressed by him. In a report by Tangata 
Pasifika, Aotearoa–New Zealand’s long-running, state-funded news and 
current affairs television programme targeted at Pacific peoples, one of 
the Pacific Islanders says of the visa, ‘this is from god’. Afakasi Slade, a 
Pentacostal Church Minister who was one of the first people to purchase 
a visa from Otimi, recounts that when he was issued with a deportation 
notice, Otimi ‘came along and said to the Immigration, “back off, I’m 
whanau to these people”’ (TVNZ). Slade explains that Otimi also gave 
him a new Maori name — Hohepa Otimi te Awhetu — and maintains, 
‘I’m now a free man because I know that I’m being adopted by the Maori’ 
(ibid.). For Slade, or ‘Awhetu’, Otimi’s visa offers an integration of 
personal and political identities, and his own Samoan name is something 
he is willing to surrender in order to obtain this integration — something 
that he articulates in terms of ‘freedom’.
Unlike the Original Nation Passports produced by Aboriginal 
Australian activists in support of and solidarity with asylum seekers, 
Otimi’s activism — for certainly, his hapu visa is, whatever else it might 
be, a statement of Maori sovereignty — constitutes an economic as well as 
political transaction: Otimi made a large sum of money from the enterprise. 
His use (perhaps mimicry, perhaps reterritorialization) of the western- 
derived model of documentation to validate political belonging — the 
visa and the passport — includes an appropriation of the economics 
imbricated in this classification and documentation system. Anyone who 
has applied for a passport or settlement visa will know that the financial 
costs (not to mention the emotional investment) are high — for many, 
prohibitively so. In other words, political belonging, within the terms of 
citizenship or residency of the modern nation-state, comes at a premium. 
Otimi provokes the question of what happens when a right of settlement 
granted by a Maori sovereign authority operates according to a similar 
6 Otimi is referring to tino rangatiratanga, by which he means ‘absolute 
sovereignty’. See Note 3 for further information on the contention surrounding 
this term in relation to interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi.
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rubric of value and exchange as a right of settlement sold by a state sov-
ereign immigration authority. Undoubtedly, the status of hapu whangai 
for the Pacific Islanders came, quite literally, at a cost.
Of course, the question of Otimi’s fraudulence — something we 
might assess by weighing his knowledge that financial payment would 
not produce the kind of recognized legal status the Pacific migrants pre-
sumably believed they were purchasing, against his cultural and politi-
cal convictions regarding the legal status that Maori sovereignty should 
hold — is complicated and fraught. The case brings issues of indigenous 
sovereignty, hospitality, political integrity, and capitalism into uneasy 
convergence, and raises several problems for our understanding of how 
indigeneity functions, and for whom, in contemporary contexts. Otimi’s 
use of his indigenous identity to exert power over vulnerable people, his 
brazen assertion of right without obligation, disrupts and reorients sim-
plistic lines of association between indigeneity, ethical hospitality, anti-
capitalism, and anti-exploitation. Otimi’s motives were, we can say with 
some certainty, at least partly financial and exploitative. Nevertheless, 
his actions demand a reappraisal of the ontology of sovereignty — how 
Maori sovereignty may be said to exist, what the consequences of this 
existence are and where they become consequent. In addition, they focus 
an inherent problem with an individual vindicating his or her actions 
with reference to collective (in this case, indigenous) values; in all likeli-
hood, for every Maori person who supports Otimi’s activism, there will 
be another who, like prominent Maori politician Pita Sharples, likens it 
to ‘theft’ (quoted in OneNews 2010).
The affair also draws attention to the geo-culturally specific issue 
of the relationship between different Pacific indigeneities. Otimi sold 
passports to Pacific peoples, in other words, peoples who share his own 
Polynesian ancestry. Aotearoa–New Zealand’s post-settlement bicultural 
(Maori–Pakeha) paradigm — which, starting in the late 1970s, has come 
to inflect the nation’s executive, legislative and judicial structures as well 
as cultural identifications — positions Maori in relation to the European-
origin New Zealander, and vice-versa. Importantly, the bicultural para-
digm is crucial for the Maori as far as the Treaty of Waitangi settlement 
claims to the British Crown are concerned. But it arguably marginal-
izes other alignments and affiliations. It permits two privileged spaces of 
belonging, Maori and Pakeha, and in legal terms, the Polynesian indige-
neity of most other Pacific peoples does not confer them access to either. 
The Pacific peoples whom Otimi purported to bring into his hapu can 
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be said to have some relationship with it on the basis of Polynesian kin-
ship links, however distant, but in legal terms, their right to belong is no 
different from that of any other non-citizen (indeed, their legitimacy is 
less than that of Australians, who hold reciprocal residency rights with 
Aotearoa–New Zealand). If Otimi, as self-proclaimed representative of 
his hapu, or any of the individuals he sold visas to — or both — professes 
the sorts of affective sentiments that Benedict Anderson (1991) identi-
fies as the basis of imagined communities (and the fervent group fol-
lowing Otimi inspired in many of the Pacific Islanders indicates that 
attachments were formulated, either with Otimi himself or with the idea 
of belonging that he represents) then it must be said that Otimi’s actions 
lay bare the aporia of imagined communities vis-à-vis political belonging 
(citizenship). It is within this zone of misalignment that the meanings, 
the very ontology, of sovereignty and citizenship as well as kinship and 
belonging are shown as radically ambivalent political and affective ideas/
ideals.
The bicultural paradigm does not, it should be said, sufficiently 
encompass Aotearoa–New Zealand’s contemporary cultural, social, eco-
nomic, and political positionings. Indeed, the nation’s relationship with 
the Pacific articulates to post-colonial Pakeha paradigms as well as to 
indigenous kinship links. Mark Williams notes that many of Aotearoa–
New Zealand’s key cultural, social and diplomatic relations, if not its 
economic ties, are situated in the South Pacific, unlike in Australia, 
where economic and even cultural focus is increasingly directed at that 
nation’s proximity to (or as some argue, belonging to) Asia (1996: 635). 
Aotearoa–New Zealand’s relationship with Asia has been influenced 
since the mid-1990s by prominent Maori politicians Winston Peters and 
Tau Henare, who have become known for their vitriolic, populist oppo-
sition to mainly Asian immigration (Ip 2003: 244, 246). This context, 
in combination with the Polynesian indigenous connections I have dis-
cussed, highlights another important difference between the meanings 
and implications of Otimi’s Maori visas and the Aboriginal passports for 
asylum seekers. Although the unauthorized migrant’s vulnerability to 
state power is central to both, in the Australian case support is offered by 
Aboriginal activists in the face of explicit alterity, while in the Aotearoa–
New Zealand case certain ties already bind the parties.
It is difficult to draw out the various threads of what, precisely, the 
Maori visa might mean for Slade/Awhetu and others like him. The pos-
session of an indigenous identity — that is, Otimi’s purchasable version 
of it — seems genuinely to have produced certain affects of belonging. 
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The term ‘possession’ should not be glossed over: the visas are not merely 
owned as commodities in a materialist mode, but are assimilated into the 
buyers’ identities. It is surprising, to say the least, that a Samoan person 
would be willing to ‘become’ Maori in order achieve an integrated per-
sonal and political identity — a dubious one at that. The economic and 
ontological aspects of the visas might be drawn together if we consider 
how they create conditions for performative utterances. On the one hand, 
Otimi’s indigenous commodities enable him to articulate, under the glare 
of national media and face-to-face with juridico-political authorities (the 
police, immigration officials, judges, politicians) his conviction regarding 
Maori sovereignty. And on the other, Slade/Awhetu is able to name, 
before his local community and to a community of citizens via the news 
media, his legitimacy (and freedom). Marina Sbisà (2006) examines 
the communication of citizenship with reference to speech act theory, 
recognizing the way relations of power inflect this communication. She 
argues: ‘Communicating citizenship cannot be reduced to transmis-
sion of information, let alone mental content, but consists also or even 
primarily of ways of acting by which participants recognize or attribute 
to each other the rights, obligations, expectations etc. that citizenship 
involves, therefore affecting their actual possession of these’ (ibid.: 151). 
The economic expense and cultural renunciation that Slade/Awhetu’s 
transaction with Otimi entails might be the very obligations that, for 
him, endow it with legitimacy: he has paid the price for indigenous citi-
zenship, and as such, may communicate it.
But the communication of citizenship is an intersubjective act, requir-
ing the transmission of similar understandings between interlocutors, 
or as Sbisà argues more precisely, ‘transmission of information can be 
described as the production of an entitlement to assert’ (ibid.: 158). 
Whichever way Otimi’s Pacific Island clients might understand the legal 
(non-) status of their visas, and whatever kind of illocutionary force 
might accompany their assertions of indigenous belonging, their trans-
actions as a whole underscore the dialectics between the state and the 
individual, assertion and belief, performative utterance and ontological 
change, that underpin the positionalities of citizen and alien, belonging 
and non-belonging, indigenous and non-indigenous.
In the final part of this chapter, I want to look at a rather different 
kind of performative engagement between indigenous people and non-
citizens. Moana and the Tribe, a band led by Moana Maniapoto — one 
of Aotearoa–New Zealand’s most successful musicians — performs four 
times a year for refugees at the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre in 
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the city of Auckland.7 The band’s music fuses traditional and contempo-
rary Maori performance forms and their work is underpinned by explicit 
political engagement — their commercial success sits alongside and 
promotes their commitment to Maori cultural representation and social 
development. Maniapoto describes the band’s regular performances at 
the Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre in terms of affective cultural 
transactions. In April 2009, she stated on her website: 
Next week, we head out to the Refugee centre, me and the gals to do our 
regular concert for the next incoming group of refugees from Afghanistan, 
Congo, Rwanda, Iraq etc. It’s something we got into a year ago — just war-
bling a few songs and teaching some Maori to the refugees. We really enjoy 
it — especially the bit where we get to cuddle the gorgeous babies!! And, we 
get entertained by the refugees because we make each group sing a song from 
their homeland. It gets positively party-like sometimes! (Maniapoto 2009).
The band’s visits to the centre, this comment seems to suggest, are 
cultural-artistic interactions between performers and spectators that 
produce event-based multicultural communities. Teaching Maori to the 
refugees and having the refugees perform songs from their homelands, 
Maniapoto and her fellow artists instigate exchanges of cultural know-
ledge and a mutually affective reciprocity.
Like many of the Aboriginal supporters of asylum seekers and refugees 
that I have discussed, Maniapoto contextualizes her band’s presence at 
the centre with reference to an indigenous morality, specifically here, 
the Maori value of manaakitanga, or hospitality and generosity: ‘If you 
look at our culture, we have a history of manaakitanga, of looking after 
visitors. Refugees, there are only 750 a year. I think New Zealand could 
up that quota, double it at least’ (quoted in Gifford 2009). Maniapoto 
interpolates an indigenous moral history into the executive operations 
of the sovereign state. A practical dimension of this interpolation is the 
linguistic and cultural exchanges that her band generates. If language 
is an absolutely paramount means by which newcomers orient or posi-
tion spaces of belonging within the community in which they arrive, 
7 The Mangere Refugee Resettlement Centre is a former New Zealand Army 
base, and the central processing and assessment location for all refugees who 
arrive in New Zealand. Refugees undergo a six-week period of assessment and 
orientation prior to resettlement. As a consequence of its remote geography, New 
Zealand does not receive even a fraction of the number of unauthorized asylum 
seekers that Australia does.
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Moana and the Tribe work to ensure that Maori language is part of that 
orientation.
The activism, social interaction and performance that I have dis-
cussed here are in many ways marginal; they remind us that the implica-
tions and meanings of the explicitly global or transnational phenomena 
of asylum and migration are negotiated and contested within communi-
ties and between individuals, as much as through legislation and state 
biopolitics. At the same time, they instantiate indigenous concerns and 
interests as global, and not just local, concerns and interests. Through 
their engagements with asylum and illegal immigration, and with the 
people bound to these descriptors, Aboriginal Australians and Maori 
(re)position themselves in the face of postcolonial governmental, legis-
lative and cultural paradigms — which to some extent, it may be said, 
many indigenous peoples are in, but not of. And inasmuch as they are 
publicly enacted, these engagements invite citizen-spectators to examine 
their practical, conceptual and even ethical understandings of the condi-
tions that impinge upon amorphous citizenships — and sovereignties — 
in the 21st century. 
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